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Abstract 
In the post 1991 context of ’politics of ethnic identity’ along with ‘politics of equal dignity’, this article examines 
Kemant’s quest for self-determination that the federalist system provides for ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ 
of Ethiopia, whilst struggling for the recognition of their ethnic identity over the past two decades. By exploring 
their de facto existence, and precedence, in the federalist state, the article tracks the political history of Kemant 
nationality’s struggle. It aims to contribute to the lively political debate on the authenticity of Kemant’s political 
quest and provides fascinating insights for further inquiries. Drawing on qualitative exploratory research, the 
article argues that Kemant people’s political struggle, which has grown- out of conditions of alienation and 
discontent in Ethiopian federal experiment that denied their very distinct existence, is mainly entrenched in 
identity reclaims before it entirely melts down in the federal arrangement. It is not only a socio-political act of 
recovering fractured Kemant identity, but also an instrumentalist act for demanding autonomous political 
administration that can provide a sense of security and autonomy to promote, maintain and reconstruct their 
identity. Thus, identity and autonomy are intimately linked, and simultaneously demanded by the Kemant people. 
Keywords: Kemant; Identity; Autonomy; Ethiopia; Federalism  
 
1. Introduction  
In the early 1990s Ethiopia, one of the most populated (over 85 million) and the most pluralist (more than 80 
ethno-linguistic groups) country in Africa (Central Statistics Agency, 2008), has witnessed a major politico-legal 
departure from the previous regimes in providing startling way of ‘nation building’. Ethiopian Peoples' 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), who came to power in May 1991 following the downfall of the 
Dergue
i
  regime, introduced the ethnic based federal system, adopted a constitutional framework (in 1995) and 
installed the discourse of multinational politics of ‘nation-building’ (Merera, 2002; Yakob, 2010:35), and 
ultimately, in due course, engaged in ‘a politics of ethnic identity’ alongside ‘a politics of equal dignity’ for 
national unity, social justice and democracy to prevail in Ethiopia.  
 
By making ethnicity as valid categories of the federal arrangement and territorial governance and a basis for 
political organization (Mengie, 2010:10), the regime has increased the political salience of ethnic identities. 
Ethnic groups are not only political objectives but also indispensable for building the federal polity (Beken, 
2012:3); nothing like the previous regimes who had spotted ethnic politics as impediment to ‘nation- building’ 
(Baharu Zewude, 2008). Ethnic sentiment has gradually crept in to find a place in the political restructuring.  
 
At present, seventy five ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’
ii
  have a representation in the federal government, 
particularly in the House of Federation (HF), and regional councils that emanated from their acceptance and 
recognition as distinct ethnic groups by the state
iii
;  among others the Awi, Himra and Argoba in Amhara 
regional state, Erob and Kunama in Tigray regional state and Alba and Silte Gurage in Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) have a political place. They are also self-governing 
‘nationalities’ within their respective territories. Very small populated groups of Qewama (298), She (320) and 
Dime (981) in SNNPRS were recognized as distinct ‘nationalities’ in 2007. The Koyego, Karo, Murle and 
Gedicho were officially recognized in 2007 for the first time (CSA, 2008). 
 
Despite such kinds of post 1991 political developments, the Kemant ‘nationality’ remains unrecognized as the 
constituents of the federal polity, and henceforth denied the opportunity for self- determination that the federalist 
system has granted for ‘nations, nationalities and people’, while their claim has been vocal. So crucial is their 
dependence on state recognition that, their very distinct existence depends, parity of participation and 
representation in the political and governance structures is severely undermined. And yet, the question of 
Kemant distinct ‘nationality’ has been debated throughout the last two decades albeit large numbers of self-
declared individuals have been struggling for since the configuration of the federal system.  
 
This article examines Kemant’s simultaneous quest for recognition, and reconstruction, of their ethnic identity 
and political autonomy for administering themselves. It contributes to the lively political debate on their quest 
and provides insights for further inquiries. In this regard, the first part of this article examines the political and 
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legal framework in post 1991 within which the quest operates. The second part outlines the research sites and the 
methodology utilized. The third part presents the origin, geographic settlement and self- defined identity of 
Kemant-ness to illustrate Kemant’s de facto existence. The fourth part explores the political history of Kemant 
struggle in post 1991. The fifth part examines Kemant’s aspirations for identity and autonomy. Finally, the 
conclusion part sums up the arguments of the article. 
 
2. The Setting: Politico- legal Frameworks in post 1991 Ethiopia  
In post 1991, Ethiopian has witnessed a major politico-legal departure from the previous regimes. The new 
regime (EPRDF) has configured federalism grounded upon ethnic lines, and recognition of socio-cultural and 
political pluralism. The very notion of ethnicity gained currency and ethnic identities accepted as valid 
categories of the federal experiment that have, of course, prompted a debate around its divisive effects. Soon, 
individuals and groups actively participated in ethnic politics. This section explores the federalist state discourses 
and constitutional framework, which are presumably quite relevant in understanding and examining the context 
within which claims of ethnic groups operate.    
 
2.1 State (Political-) Discourses: Multi-nationality and Unity in Diversity 
Multi-nationality, a key terminology in Ethiopian society and politics, is virtually a recent vintage, emerged 
since 1990s, of political expression of accepting and celebrating the plurality of Ethiopian societies in which 
each group assumed to have equal political status. The EPRDF, the rhetorical fount of this discourse, deems as a 
panacea for the long standing ‘nationality question,’ for identity and autonomy. It has the effect of legitimizing 
ethnic based federal arrangements. This discourse has been echoed by political elites. The former President 
Girma Wolde Goiorgies said that ‘Ethiopia is a mosaic of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ who either are free 
to practice and uphold their own linguistic, religious and cultural identity that had not been the case during the 
past regimes (Hibre Bihar, 2011:3).  The former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Melse Zenawi, added that they are 
‘sources of our strength and beauty’ (Ibid: 9). This political rhetoric certainly increases the sense of ethno- 
nationalist and cultural sentiments.  
 
To portray and promote the diversity of the state, the government celebrates ‘Nation, Nationalities and People's 
Day’ annually in November marked by decorated national and regional flags, cultural festivities and extensively 
live televised coverage of events depicting the importance of the day for members of the federal polity, in terms 
of granting equal status and dignity. The national day publicizes the constituents of the federal polity and their 
distinctive customs and traditions of different groups that could generate self-esteem and strong identification to 
their ‘nationality’. It, thus, provides a venue for a politicized festivity to reinforce ethno-nationalist politics of the 
state. Indeed, it is a de facto recognition of ethnic identities, at least, and a legitimate basis for maneuvering 
further demands.  
 
Unity in Diversity, a multiculturalist approach of ‘nation-building’, is increasingly become another governing 
discourse of post 1991 Ethiopian politics. It is partly a continuation of the earlier imagining of ‘national unity’ 
dated back to the 19th century, to the early 20th century, but with a different strategy of ‘nation building,’  in 
which ‘nationalities’ able to maintain and celebrate their distinct identities while at the same time constituting 
the bigger family of Ethiopians (Nini Abino, 2012:2). It is a statist perspective pronounced in terms of 
recognizing the plurality of the Ethiopian societies, but with a common and shard element of ‘national identity’, 
i.e., Ethiopianism. This can’t only underpin the prevailing role of multi-nationality, but also believed to provide a 
common sense of unity. It promises to challenge the centrifugal tendencies of ethnic politics in the country. 
However, it remains politically and academically debated issue whether the post 1991 system has strengthened 
‘national unity’ or ethno-national sentiments instead.  
 
2.2 Constitutional Setting 
The 1995 Constitution is a multicultural document that explicitly recognizes Ethiopia’s plurality in its preamble 
by stating ‘We Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’. Yet, it doesn't explicate any precise definitions of these 
terminologies. Thus, it provides the opportunity for ethnic groups to frame their status on their own interest. 
Despite this terminological ambiguity, the basic principles set under the Constitution affirm the protection of 
‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ by offering vigorous rights for the expression and development of ethno-
linguistic and cultural identities. The Constitution recognizes ethnic groups’ inalienable right to enjoy and 
develop their languages (art. 5(1)); provides equal protection regardless of any criteria such as language, religion 
etc. (art. 25); and offers freedom of religion, belief and opinion (art.27). The right to self-determination and 
parity of participation are also constitutionally granted. Article 39 provides the right to self-determination up to 
secession. Article 61 (2) provides representation rights to all nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia in the 
House of Federation (FDRE, 1995). These rights are the legal basis for identity and autonomy claims, and also 
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basics in governing the polity. Reinforced by the political discourse, the constitutional framework enables groups 
to use the notion of ethnicity and to anticipate that the framework would address ethnic demands and aspirations.  
 
3. Research Sites and Methodology 
Selection of Study Sites: Two urban centers, Gonder and Aykel towns, in Amhara regional state of Ethiopia were 
purposively selected. Gonder is the capital of North Gonder Administration Zone, an administrative level below 
the regional administration. The town is located at 419 Kms North West of Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. 
Based on the 2007 national census, Gondar has a total population of 206,987, of whom 98,085 are men and 
108,902 women. It is the epicenter of the political movement and a place where the Interim Coordinating 
Committee for Kemant people’s quest for Identity and Self-rule is located. Aykel, on the other hand, is the 
administrative center of Chilga woreda, local administration lower than Zone and higher than kebele. It is 
located at a distance of 61 Kms to the West of Gondar town. Based on figures from the Central Statistical 
Agency in 2007, Chilga woreda has an estimated total population of 270,994 of whom 111, 997 are men and 109, 
364 are women. It is one of the historic Kemant land and a place where the traditional religion is still maintained 
and practiced. In addition, it has the largest Kemantney speakers and the large number of self-identified Kemant 
people. 
 
Methods of Data Collection: The field-based research on which this article is based utilized a combination of 
qualitative methods: semi-structured key informant interviews with  five purposively selected Kemant political 
elites, in Gonder and Aykel, and  the House of Federation Directorate in Addis Ababa;  in-depth interview with 
the Deputy Chairperson of the Interim Coordinating Committee for Kemant Nationality Quest for Identity and 
Self- rule  in Gonder and with the Chairperson of Chilga Wereda Council and member of the Central executive 
committee in Aykel; and four focus group discussions each consisted of six participants were conducted in 
Gonder and Aykel towns. Discussants were purposively selected, who revealed themselves as Kemant, and 
consisted of retired government officials, civil servants and self-employed men and women ranges from 25- 65 
years of old. Most of them had a formal education of different levels. Ensuring the willingness of participants 
had been given priority. Legal documents and reports were also used for analysis. The data collection took place 
from July 9 to August 23, 2013.  
 
4. The Kemant People: Who are they?  
Although the Kemant was mentioned in the 18th century
iv
, the question of ‘who are the Kemant people?’ has 
been one of the contentious issues since 1991. Their early history is more obscured and hence it becomes a 
puzzle for scholars interested to study this people. Prior to the analysis of their quest, it is, therefore, important 
and desirable to know ‘who are the Kemant?’ This section looks myths of Kemant origin, their settlement and 
conception of Kemant-ness.  
 
4.1 Myths of Origin 
According to the myth of origin, when the Canaan land in Middle East had faced with drought and hunger, 
Aynar (the father of the Kemant) and his families came to Ethiopian passed by today’s Egypt. The exact period, 
however, remains unknown. Aynar (also known as Yaner) has been identified as the great grandson of Canaan, 
grandson of Ham, son of Noah (Tourny, 2009: 1226). It is believed that he used to live in the forest area of 
Karkar in Chilga
v
, but further data is unavailable (Gamst, 1969:58). On the basis of this mythology, the majority 
of informants traced their origin to the mythical ancestors Canana and Ayner. In contrary, some others identified 
themselves as descendants of Keberu/Keberua who is the son of Adarayke, whom they believe as the founding 
father of Kemant (Dawit, 2010: 60). Despite these different views, there is a common account that Kemant’s 
roots traced to the land of Israel.  Of course, some scholars have found that the Kemant have close ethnic and 
historical linkage with Ethiopian Jewish (Bete Israel) (Quirin, 1998; Tourny, 2009). It also evident that some 
‘out-group’ individuals identified the Kemant as emigrants from Egypt (Tinbitu, 2005EC
vi
: 25; Tourny, 2009: 
1226) due to the mythical attachment to the land as a passage to Ethiopia.  
 
Etymologically speaking, the word ‘Kemant’ seemingly derived from the terminology ‘Kemä-ent’, literally 
which means ‘You Kam or Kamatic’ implying the people of ‘Kam’ descents
vii
 which reinforces Kemant’s ethno- 
geographic self- identification as descendent of ancient Israelites. In essence, the word ‘Kemant’ denotes more 
than a description of the people having a common ancestor or origin. It strongly affirms that they have a 
collective name which symbolizes their uniqueness and distinguishes them from other groups. It has also a 
potential for political usage.  
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4.2 People and Land 
The Kemant are the original inhabitants of the north central Ethiopia (Gamst, 1969:1). Their historical land 
stretched from north of Lake Tana, the origin of Abya River (Blue Nile), to North West rural areas around 
Gonder town (The Interim Committee, 2004EC: 6). Chilga, Metema and Lay Armachiho were the historic places. 
Since the mid-1950s, they have been immigrated to the areas inhabited by Amharas and established their 
settlements.
viii
 Nowadays, the Kemant reside around the highlands of northern and north western parts of Gonder 
town (Tinbitu, 2005EC: 34). The deputy chairperson of the Interim Committee revealed that the Kemant 
inhabited eight woredas in North Gonder Zone contiguously, including Quara, Chilga, Lay Armachiho, Denbia 
and Metema and portions of Wogra, partially in Gondar and Gonder Zuria Woreda. These areas are also 
inhabited by a large Amhara population.  
 
According to the 1984 and 1994 Ethiopian Housing and Population Census the total population of the Kemant 
was 169,169 and 172,327, and the 17th and 10th populated groups respectively. Without doubt, the census 
reports were less likely to reflect the exact population size of the time, and any conceivable demographic 
transition. This would be partly due to many were unenthusiastic to disclose their Kemant identity as it was not 
convenient time for them. The people might have preferred to hide their identity due to fear of discrimination 
and exclusion, as we shall see it later
ix
.  
 
At the moment, precise population figures have difficult to determine because the Kemant were not counted in 
the latest national census of 2007. Unofficial estimates have ranged from 300,000
x
, to 600,000
xi
, to 1 million
xii
.  
It is important to look these numbers critically because political elites might overestimate to get more public 
attention. Thus, the population size remains a major political and academic spot light. However, it would be safe 
to say that the figure is increasing due to the politico-legal changes in the past two decades. In the country where 
ethnic ‘nationality’ has been promoted and respected many might not fear to reveal their identity. The growing 
political activism is also a key factor in increasing individuals’ self- identification.  
 
4.3 Language, Religion and Ethnicity  
Language and religion are essential elements in the formation of ethnicity, i.e. a ‘collective identity’, along with 
common culture and history. They are sources and forms of social, cultural and political identification (Brubaker, 
2012:3). Kemant’s language and traditional religion has been uncovered in more details since F. Gamst's (1960) 
anthropological study of the people sixty years ago. He found the Kemant as self-evidently distinct ethnic group.  
 
During my fieldwork, many informants define themselves as a group belongs to Agew Cush family
xiii
  who speak 
or couldn't speak and/or whose ancestors spoke Kemantney language and who have common history and culture 
different from the Amharas
xiv
. Implicit is a loose attachment to the language for self- identification criterion. 
Kemantney is not written language. It belongs to the central Cushitic Agew languages
xv
 (Appleyard, 1974:3160) 
and hence a sister language of the Agew-Awi (in Gojjam) and the Xamta (in Wollo) of Ethiopia and the Bil of 
Eritrea (Zelalem, 2002: 11).  
 
In the 1994 population census, 4831 people were Kemantney speakers. The recent Interim Committee's survey 
(2004EC) reveals more than 6000 speakers in 54 sample kebeles
xvi
 mainly elderly people (on average those of 
above 50) in Chilga, Lay Armachiho and Wogera woredas. But, they are bilingual in Kemanteny and Amharic.
xvii
   
Therefore Kemantney seems in no way endangered or ‘on the verge of extinct,’ as stated by Dawit (2010) and 
Zelalem (2003). It is an important marker of identity in multilingual Ethiopian society. This research, however, 
found that many people identified themselves as Kemant though unable to speak the language.  
 
Historically, the role of Kemant religion, Hege-Lebona
xviii
 (literally which means believe in heart), was another 
essential element in providing a sense of Kemant-ness among the people. Fredric Gamst (1969:29) stating that: 
“the religion of the Kemant is the focal point of this closely knit ethnic group, providing its members with a 
sense of group identity, reinforcing their basic values, and rigidly defining the social boundaries between 
them and their neighbor (Gamst, 1969:29) 
 
Today, the majority of Kemant belong to the Orthodox Christian, while some others are Muslims, Catholics and 
Protestants, because of the historic process of massive Christianization policies (Gamst, 1969: 1; Worku, 2010: 
2). A very few individuals who identified themselves, even by other Kemant people, as ‘awura/wana Kemant’ 
(original Kemant) (Dawite, 2010: 7), estimated as 0.01% of the total population (Timbitu, 2005EC: 48) in rural 
areas of Aykel have still maintain their old religious tradition
xix
.  Their geographic remoteness might have helped 
them to escape from the historic Christianization and assimilation policies since 14th century. The religion is still 
considered as a constitutive element for the collective identity of this group of Kemant people. Religious 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.18, 2014 
 
161 
affiliation amongst other Kemant remains. Some Orthodox Christians have been participated in religious 
ceremonies, contributed money for religious performance of the Kemant priests and respect Saturdays as their 
main Sabbath day.
xx
  
 
In sum, the majority who identify themselves as Kemant don’t speak Kemantney language nor follow Hege-
Lebona religion
xxi
, which implicates that language and religion are, important, but not the necessarily accounts 
for ethnic belongingness, while they have historically been fundamental identity markers (Gamist 1960). 
Nonconformity doesn’t necessary affect identification to the group. Kemant- ness is, thus, characterized by re-
defining identity in more inclusive terms. Indeed, self- identification grounded on the belief in common ancestor, 
which has a prime importance, culture and history have constituted Kemant identity.  
 
5. Kemant People’s Political Movement in post 1991 
Kemant political movement has largely been a post 1991 phenomenon. Beside their shared experience of 
marginalization and exclusion, and the new politico-legal environment emerged for mobilizing ethnic identities, 
their struggle has mainly grown- out of the wider conditions of discontent in the federal arrangement that denied 
and marginalized their existence as a distinct ‘nationality’. Since then, it is possible to identify at least two 
phases of their political struggles.  
 
5.1 Elite based movements in 1990s 
In 1991, like other ethnic groups, individuals around Gonder town began organizing themselves to take part in 
the federal democratic polity that would be organized on the principle of political equality, participation and 
representation of ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ of Ethiopia. Their political network was composed of 
patriarchal self-appointed middle income urban, educated and politically interested, and who had no any 
connection with political parties or militant groups of the time. Most of them, i.e., political elites, were civil 
servants.
xxii
   
 
Despite their anticipations, the transitional government (1991-1995) and the subsequently established federalist 
state (in 1995) denied the existence of Kemant while accepting more than 60 ethnic groups as the constituents of 
the federal arrangement. In the early 1990s, political elites, who claim to represent the people, with strong 
Kemant identity had grown-up. But, organized mass movement to challenge the transitional government had not 
been emerged albeit marginalization and discrimination by the federalist state created public grievance (Tinbitu, 
2005EC: 60). Political elites demonstrated little sign of overt action to mobilize the people.
xxiii
  
 
Nevertheless, sporadic political movements had continued to challenge attempts of obliterating Kemant from the 
new political map especially after the then Prime minister, Tamrat Layna, speech who pronounced that the 
Kemant, who ‘had lived around Gonder’, were for the most part thoroughly assimilated and ‘they became 
ordinary Gonderianess’ and thus, their claim of identity was inauthentic and inconsistent
xxiv
. One of the earliest 
political elites said that they were questioning about what the prime minster meant by ‘ordinary Gonderianess.’ 
He said that ‘we are Kemant nationality live in Gonder’. Soon, they re- organized themselves for demanding 
recognition of their identity and the protection of their constitutional rights. In 1993 their movement began to 
incorporate socio-economic and environmental issue by establishing Kemant Development association (KDA), 
that bear a resemblance to western style of civil society organizations, to contribute towards alleviating socio-
economic problems of the people. The then Chairperson of the association, Nega Geta, revealed that they had a 
‘plan to change the association to political party’, named as Kemant People Democratic Movement (KPDM). 
The association was seen as the financial basis for the establishment of the party. Latter, being suspicious of their 
engagement with the public and political activities beside the inconvenient early periods for the regime, the state 
urged elites to withdraw their activities which resulted in the closure of the association.  
 
Despite the broad spectrum of the political movement, including struggles for identity, rights, development and 
environment issues, the movement had no clear organizational structure and had been separated from the public 
as well. The focus of their activities in urban areas perhaps gave little hope to the majority of rural people to 
support the movement.  This was evident in 1995. When the federalist state was established and continued the 
marginalization of the Kemant from the mew political map, although public anger against the state was prevailed, 
political elites couldn’t attract the public to strength and legitimize their struggle. In 1990s up to mid-2000s elite 
dominated political movement had not been successful in challenging the federal experiment. However, the 
movement produced a political consciousness amongst the urban and educated Kemant people.   
 
5.2 Organized Mass Movements in post 2007 
The second phase of Kemant nationalist movement has emerged recently triggered by the 2007 population 
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census. When their previous distinct status was denied, and discriminatory privilege was given, political elites 
highly politicized the census by framing it as ‘silent identity genocide’. This gave rise to a strong nationalist 
sentiment and political awareness across urban and rural area, leading to mass mobilization and engagement. In 
the late 2000s, Kemant’s political movement has gained more prominence.
xxv
  
 
In May 2007, a committee consisted of seven members was established by political elites for challenging the 
state’s abrogation of their ethnicity from the census. Requests had been made to North Gonder Zone Statistics 
Office, Amhara National Regional State Population and Housing Census Commission and Central Statistics 
Agency (CSA) to include the Kemant ethnicity and language in the census questionnaire. In addition, the 
committee had took the case to the House of Federation (HF), but the census continued without any change
xxvi
  
and finally the Kemant were believed to be counted under ‘Amhara ethnic group’ or ‘Other Ethiopian nationals’ 
category.
xxvii
  
 
In May 2009, Kemant Nationality Claim for Identity and self-rule Coordinating Committee also known as the 
Interim Committee was established signaling the new phase in the political movement. It is an ad hoc committee, 
and the sole political agent, for coordinating activities and presenting claims to the polity in a peaceful, non-
violent and legal manner under the politico- legal framework provided in post 1991. With its political base in 
Gonder town the Committee claims to represent all Kemant people, which legitimizes and hence consolidates the 
quest. It has a Council consists of 120 members from all Kemant woredas. The Council established 12 Central 
Executive Committees of which three (3) were females. Its leadership, for the most part, is in the hands of male 
urban educated individuals. The organizational structure of the Interim Committee also includes Kemant Women 
Association (KWS) and Kemant Youth Association (KYA). In order to perform day to day activities, the 
coordinating committee has extended its organizational structure to woreda and kebele levels
xxviii
  that could 
bring the grassroots people closer to the Committee.  
 
The Committee has managed to gain substantial public support. In July 2009, it protested, and presented to the 
House of Federations, through 18,584 public petitions and one woreda and 10 kebele administrations official 
letters supporting their political struggle. Undoubtedly, it signals a change from purely elite affairs to mass 
political movement. However, not all Kemant people support the movement especially those government 
officials of Kemant origin. Lack of the necessary economic basis and representation in the state, it become very 
difficult to robust the political struggles. Therefore, the Interim Committee should search for support from the 
mainstream political parties, the media, the scholarship and the general public.  
 
6. Reclaiming and Reconstructing Kemant Identity  
The Kemant, for a century, have been stigmatized and identified in demeaning terms, labelled as ‘wood’, ‘born 
of wood’ and ‘worshippers of wood’ associated with their supply of wood to Gonder town, worshippers in grove 
trees and women’s wooden earrings (Quirin, 1998: 217; Zelalem, 2003:46-51). It was partly this 
‘dehumanization’, ‘impaired subjectivity’ and ‘damaged self-identity’ that led individuals’ self- denial and 
Amharanazation of themselves for many years (Worku, 2010:2; Zelalem, 2003:46) let alone a strong ethno- 
nationalist sentiments to emerge. 
 
By the early 1990s, however, the people began to challenge the institutional denial of Kemant from constituting 
the new federalist political map of Ethiopia, while its de facto existence precedes the politico-legal dynamics of 
the federal state. With the onset of a new framework in post 1991Ethiopia configured by ethnic federalism, some 
nationalists had been involved in political activism at local and regional levels demanding state’s acceptance of 
the hitherto marginalized and stigmatized identity and a transformative pubic attitude towards Kemant through 
public institutions. In this manner, socio-legal recognition and respect for Kemant identity had taken salient 
precedence in their political movement.
xxix
  
 
Identity aspirations surfaced with a renewed sprite in post 2007 whereupon consciousness of being part of, 
declaring, and promoting Kemant identity progressively appeared. However, by no means Kemant exists in the 
federal polity as the statist perspective holds. The Amhara regional government, in whose jurisdiction the claim 
is made, has continuously expressed that the Kemant have not a distinct socio-cultural tradition from the 
Amharas neither ‘mutually intelligible language among the majority’.  This has fuelled public reaction in 
resisting attempts of assimilation, but also signaled to adopt a new path for Kemant identity aspirations. 
Consequently, since the late 2000s Kemant’s quest has been marked by identity reclaims and reconstruction 
efforts in order to challenge the statist view through solidifying their ethnic boundaries.  
 
Yet, considering their history of assimilation, political elites believe that they have any past to reclaim. In this 
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regard, they strongly expressed the discourse of ‘recapturing lost identity,’
xxx
 cognizing and reclaiming ‘who 
they are/were’ (ontological claim). As one informant described, ‘we have engaged to reclaim our identity with a 
strong nationalist feeling’. But, as we shall see later, the process of recapturing identity has essentially involved 
in reconstruction of ‘what they want to be’ under the federal system (political aspiration). Quite positive 
development in Kemant’s identity politics is that the discourse in itself has never produced competing 
understandings of Kemant- ness, so far, that could jeopardize common identity aspirations.  
 
Like the majority of my informants understanding of Kemant- ness, Agew Cushitic people of Kam descendants, 
the Interim Committee, by making language and socio-cultural traditions more salient, has engaged in restoring 
Kemant identity markers and consciousness. It has been providing language teachings for children and adults, in 
Gonder, Aykel and Lay Armachiho woredas, outside state’s formal education system. In addition, it has been 
organizing cultural platforms to revive and articulate apparently long forgotten socio- cultural traditions for 
restoring people’s sense of Kemant-ness through the development of individual's ‘self-confidence’, ‘self-respect’ 
and ‘self-esteem’. Thus, the discourse of ‘recapturing lost identity’ is a move to revitalize ethnic consciousness 
through recovering, reconstructing and mobilizing their distinct elements that could help to define Kemant- ness 
and to increase individual’s sense of identification to Kemant. Focus group discussants stated that they are proud 
of their identity and especially the young were enthusiastic to able to speak their language. Therefore, I would 
say that the emphasis on recapturing lost identity has been partly characterized by ‘Kemantizing’ the people.  
 
Although Kemant people’s quest is not necessarily, or motivate by the desire, for recapturing the traditional 
Hege-libona religion because the majority of Kemant are Christians today, the Interim Committee has a strong 
linkage with the religious leader (Wenber). It observes religious ceremonies, mostly attended by the residents of 
Chilga woreda, which is important for maintaining social solidarity and preserving the religion, and for 
demarcating Kemant’s past. More importantly, it illustrates the inclusive character of Kemant-ness. The 
discourse of reclaiming identity moves beyond conceptions of self-recovering to a broader process of dialogue 
with the state. The Committee has put forward rigours demand for a favorable environment to be in placed to 
rehabilitate Kemant culture, tradition, language and to write and preserve their ‘true history’ (The Interim 
Committee, 2005EC:5)
xxxi
, which of course embedded in state’s discourse of ‘Multi-nationality’. Implicitly, state 
has no a more active and constitute role in identity reconstruction, rather a supportive one. 
 
Aspiration for identity is, therefore, self-conscious assertion increasingly pushed by elites that certainly has a 
crucial political utility in their overall quest that operates within which ethnic identity is a necessary precondition 
for autonomy and political representation in the federal polity. In essence, the recapturing Kemant identity is not 
an end state affair but instrumentalist act to demand ‘nationality’ status, along lines of common descent, history, 
tradition, and language since the federalist constitutional arrangement allows ethnic groups to gain a better sense 
of their identity and gives them the agency in determining ‘who they are’ and in maintaining and reconstructing 
their identities. 
 
7. Struggling for Autonomy in the Federalist State 
The late 2000s marked a significant development in Kemant people’s political movement. The 2007 national 
population census, and the subsequent public resentment, provided a crucial opportunity for elites to strength and 
‘radicalize’ their demands by stirring it to the level of autonomy, which resonated with Cornell’s (2002:5) idea 
that ethnic mobilization among minorities in multiethnic states has often led to demands for autonomy under the 
state or to demands for outright secession, to overcome marginalization and exclusion of the Kemant in the 
federal polity. This development has generated a new political discourse, and ideological basis, for their quest 
that pointed to effective implementation of ethnically based federal system.  
 
The Kemant enthusiastically proclaimed the demand for ‘self-rule,’ rather than calling ‘self-determination’ as the 
1995 constitution stipulates in order to thwart attempts at branding them as ‘radicalized’ or ‘secessionist’ and to 
cultivate genuine public support. This demand took recourse to the state machinery; article 39 of the federalist 
constitution is fronted as the cardinal basis for their quest. Sub article 1, explicitly states that ethnic groups have 
‘unconditional’ right to self-determination up to secession; the demand for secession from the state is, therefore, 
constitutionally protected. 
 
With quite similar understanding of ‘self-rule’, amongst the informants, the Kemant are demanding a new Zone 
or Woreda administrative structure within the Amhara regional state that provides them with political autonomy 
to govern their affairs, what Mancini (2008:554-5) termed as ‘internal self-determination,’ ‘people’s quest for 
freedom and desire to determine their own political, economic, and social life within the framework of an 
existing state’. Certainly, with the implementation of self- determination, the Kemant will have ‘parity of 
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participation’ and political representation in the regional and federal governments (article 39 (3)). Hence, their 
political aspiration inherently involves the struggle for political space with the federalist polity on the basis of 
their ethnicity towards equality with other ‘nationalities’. By the very legal fact, ‘self-rule’ also extends to 
territory autonomy including resources available in the area, and redistribution of national resources, for example 
in the form of state budget that would be allocated to the new administrative structure. 
 
Moreover, from the vantage point of most informants, ‘self- rule’ is a ‘basic constitutional demand’ that can 
provide a sense of security and autonomy to maintain, promote and reconstruct their ethnic identity (art.39 (2)
xxxii
  
as well as a special status rights (article 61 (2)) and institutions that can be used for maneuvering further identity 
politics. Hence, it essentially enhances Kemant’s identity, and Kemant’s power to challenge specific state 
policies and programs that affect their ethnicity, language, cultural tradition etc. It provides more autonomy to 
freely practice and maintain socio-cultural practices and the opportunity to make Kemantney one of official 
languages in the state. This demonstrates that ethnic identity reconstruction is linked basically to the political 
process and is largely dependent on whether political autonomy is at hand to prevent oppression and to maintain 
and able to develop identities.  
 
Like their aspirations for a recognized Kemant ethnicity, the quest for autonomy remains politically contentious. 
A statist view asserted that it is ‘self- appointed individuals who claim to represent the ‘Kemant people’ rather a 
distinct group demanding political and territorial autonomy. In the late August 2013, the Amhara Regional State 
in whose jurisdiction the claim is made declared that there are very few individuals (aged 50 and above) who 
speak Kemantney language and live in non-contiguous woredas
xxxiii
. Yet, it has not pronounced them to fall 
within the ‘nationality’ category. Therefore, neither the Kemant legally exists nor the claim for ‘self-rule’ is 
authentic.  
 
Kemant elites took a dim view of statist’s perspective, of looking ‘Who constitute the Kemant people?’ rather 
than ‘Who are the Kemant people?’ as unnecessary act of delaying or denying their aspirations. They have 
asserted that there is a great deal of prima facie evidences supporting Kemant’s fulfillment of both objective and 
subjective criteria of ‘nationality-hood’ according to the federalist principles. They have pointed out that the 
Kemant have common culture, customs and tradition, language, belief in a common identity, common 
psychological make-up, and inhabited contiguous areas. They also emphasized that most academics and 
researchers (Gamst, 1964; Quirin, 1998; Dawite, 2010; Timbitu, 2010) have approached the Kemant from the 
perspective that they are self-evidently a distinct ethnic group. While the contention between the statist view and 
Kemant aspirations is sharpened and continued, simultaneously, the development of important identity markers 
such as language and socio-cultural traditions is highly prioritized by the Interim Committee in order to 
demarcate their distinctiveness.   
 
Conclusion  
Kemant people’s political movement, grown out of conditions of alienation and discontent in Ethiopian federal 
experiment in 1990s, is entrenched in ethnic identity reclaims for autonomy. Identity assertion, and the 
subsequent legal acceptance of their ‘nationality’ status by the state, has taken precedence. Since 2007, Kemant 
nationalists have been engaged in active political struggle motivated by the desire for reclaiming Kemant’s 
distinctiveness based on common descent, and language, history and cultural tradition that had been lost by the 
historic processes of ‘Amharanization’ and Christianization policies since 14th century. They have been 
struggling to reconstruct identify markers to define and redefine Kemant-ness in a more inclusive manner and to 
solidify ethnic boundaries whilst resisting any practices of assimilation by the state. Thus, the crux of the 
political awakening and national sentiment has been revolved around ethnic identity reclaiming, rather than to be 
the victims of a superimposed identification as Amharas by the federal arrangement itself, in the context of 
multicultural politics in which they found themselves.  
 
However, aspiration for identity is not just a socio-political act of recovering or reclaiming fractured Kemant 
identity, before it entirely melts in the existing federal structure, that partly shows the experience of assimilation 
and domination, but also an instrumentalist act of Kemantizing the people for demanding, and strengthening, the 
quest for decentralization and political autonomy. As a matter of the federal experiment, solidifying both 
subjective and objective ethnic markers for achieving a recognized ‘nationality status’ in the state, which is a 
necessary condition for demanding self-determination including secession that is granted for ‘nations, 
nationalities and peoples’ of Ethiopia, remains so important in their political struggle.  
While Kemant ‘nationality’ lacks de jure recognition, since the late 2000s they have been demanding for  
political autonomy to administer themselves and for inclusion within institutional practices of the federalist 
polity that has endowed ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ ‘parity of participate’ and representation. With 
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regard to this, they are basically emphasizing (1) effective application of ethnic based federal experiment; and (2) 
the principle of non-discrimination to be applied to their demand for internal self-determination that can 
contribute for a more secure environment for maintaining and developing Kemant identity.  
 
One of the interesting finding of this research is that ethnic identity and autonomy are not end objectives or 
demands in themselves but part of a continuum in Kemant political quest. It is common to most scholarly works 
in making identity- autonomy nexus based on the idea that identity plays a crucial role in self-identification and 
claim for political and territorial autonomy. However, what is mostly missed is that strong link between the 
quests for autonomy in the search for ethnic identity. The Kemant case shows how aspirations for identity and 
autonomy are intimately connection and reinforced each other as the federal experiment provides the framework.    
 
Yet, the question remains why the Kemant continue to demand ‘self-rule’ in a situation where recognition of its 
very ‘nationality’ status by the state, a necessary precondition for self-administration in the federalist state, is 
still a distant hope? The justification still lays on Ethiopian federal experiment. The mere recognition and 
acceptance as a distinct ethnic group does not guarantee the entitlement of autonomy for self-administration 
although the federalist system has configured to guarantee self-determination opportunities including secession 
from the state. This is evident that out of the total number of more than 80 ethnic groups in the state (CSA, 2007) 
seventy five (75) ethnic groups have political and territorial autonomy and representation in the federal 
government. This state practice raises a crucial question ‘why?’ 
 
For a state ruled by minority ethnic group, Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front /Ethiopian People Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (TPLF/EPRDF), addressing the demand of other minorities of having a common history of 
marginalization and oppression seems promising. Politico-legal framework is in placed to protect and promote 
plurality of the state and to grant ethnic groups’ the opportunity to participate in the federal arrangement. Hence, 
there is no reason in principle that state under EPRDF would deny the demands of Kemant people. In this case, 
why Kemant’s quest for ethnic identity and autonomy is delayed, and perhaps denied, for the past two decades 
remains another important issue to be explored. 
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END NOTES 
i
Dergue, literally mean ‘committee’/Military Junta, refers to the Provisional Military Administrative Council that 
ruled Ethiopia from 1974-1991 
ii
 For the purpose of my analysis, I took the three categories as ethnic groups. 
iii
 Interview with constitution interpretation and constitutional rights directorate, House of Federations,  Addis 
Ababa 
iv
 As cited in Quirin (1998:203) the name ‘Kemant’ is found in 'Liberato da San Lorenzo, 28 May I7I4', in 
Camillo Beccari (ed.), Rerum Aethiopicarum: Scriptores Occidentales inediti a saeculo XVI ad XIX (I 5 vols.)   
v
 Interview with Chilga wereda Council Chair Person, Aykel; see also Tinbitu, 2005 EC pp.24-25; Dawit, 2010 
p.54 
vi
 EC means Ethiopian Calendar. It is Just 8 years behind the Gregorian calendar.    
vii
 Focus group discussions; See also Tinbitu (2005EC: 27-28) 
   
viii
 Interview with Chilga wereda Council Chair Person, Aykel 
ix
 Focus group discussion in Gonder and Aykel 
x
 Timbitu, 2005EC:34 
xi
 Interview with  political activist and former chairperson of Kemant Development association 
xii
 The Interim Committee, Research on Kemant Nationality Quest for identity and self-rule, July 2004EC 
xiii
 The Agew people ruled Ethiopia from undefined period to 1270 
xiv
 Focus group discussions, Gonder 
xv
 The four linguistic families in Ethiopia are Semitic, Omotic, Cushitic and Nilo-Saharan 
xvi
 Kebele is the smallest administrative unite in Ethiopia 
xvii
 Interview with Deputy Chair Person of the Interim Committee, Gonder 
xviii
 Hege Lebona has been described as 'pagan-Hebraic' consisted of traditional indigenous African religious 
practices with Old Testament influences. They have special outdoor places of worship, such as certain groves of 
trees, where prayers recited, sacrifices performed and offerings left. They have priesthood, though no written 
books. They venerated Saturday, observed memorial service for the dead, in common with Christians. Once a 
year, they assembled on a hill and performed sacrifices in a 'Day of Atonement'. see also Quirin (1998) pp.216- 
219 
xix
 Interview with Chilga wereda Council Chair Person, Aykel 
xx
 Focus group discussion, Aykel; Interview with Chilga wereda Council Chair Person, Aykel; Dawit, 2010 
pp.80-83 
xxi
 Interview with Deputy Chair Person of the Interim Committee, Gonder 
xxii
 Interview with political activist and former chairperson of Kemant Development association in 1990s 
xxiii
 Former Chairperson of The Kemant quest for Recognition Coordinating Committee 
xxiv
 Interview with Deputy Chair Person of the Interim Committee; and Interview with political activist and 
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former chairperson of Kemant Development Association 
xxv
 Interview with Deputy Chair Person of the Interim Committee 
xxvi
 Ibid 
xxvii
 Others’ category includes nationals who have no ethnic background which are recognized under Ethiopian 
polity or who are not identified themselves to any ethnic group. 
xxviii
 Interview with Deputy Chair Person of the Interim Committee  
xxix
 The struggle for Kemant identity has never been a new phenomenon of post 1991.Since 14th century, the 
Abyssinia (historic name of Ethiopia) incursion to Kemant, the people tried to protect their identity and integrity  
and maintained control of their land by incorporated peacefully and pay tribute to the state (see Quirin 1998 
pp.218-220). In 20th century, Womber (leader of Kemant religion) wrote a letter to Emperior Hailselassie (1931-
1974) to preserve their religion and their desire not to be Charistainized. 
xxx
 The Interim Committee,  2004, p.5 
xxxi
 The Interim Committee Letter to the House of Federations, January 14, 2005 EC 
xxxii
 Article 39 (2) states that ethnic groups have the right to use and develop their own languages; to express, to 
develop and promote its culture; and preserve its historical heritage 
xxxiii
 Office of the Speaker of the Amhara National Regional Council, Decision on Kemant Nationality Quest for 
Identity and Self-rule, August 2005 EC, Bahir Dar, Ethiopia. Translation mine 
